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Self-Censorship and the Press in Hong Kong 
Carolyn Shemwell 
Introduction 
In the years prior to the return of Hong Kong from British to Chinese hands, there was a 
great deal of speculation as to whether freedom of the press would be maintained under new 
government control.  Before 1997 Hong Kong boasted one of the highest degrees of press 
freedom in Asia (Lee, “Media Structure…,” p. 117), and no one was exactly certain what would 
result from a change in leadership.  Under the rule of the British colonial government, an Official 
Secrets Act was in place in the territory which prohibited the publishing of information believed 
to be threatening to national security. (Richburg)  Although this law had never been utilized, one 
Hong Kong legislator remarked that if the government saw the need, this legislation could 
potentially “close down all the media.” (Richburg)  Many journalists feared that if the Beijing 
government were granted the same unspecified powers after 1997, it would not be as benign in 
its usage of the provision.  A prediction was made that if Hong Kong’s markets remained free, 
the judiciary remained independent, and the outspoken Apple Daily newspaper continued to be 
published, press freedom would remain intact. (Freedom Forum Asia) With the handover 
approaching, doubts increased among journalists and the general public as Chinese government 
leaders hinted at the manner in which the press should operate under new leadership.  There was 
great speculation as the media attempted to decipher the impending government’s ambiguous 
statements.  Five years later, uncertainty remains and debate continues as to whether press 
freedom is truly a reality in Hong Kong.  In the opinion of Carol Lai, the former chairwoman of 
the Hong Kong Journalist Association, “It is self-censoring, rather than direct intervention (from 
China), that will more likely undermine freedom of expression in Hong Kong.” (Freedom Forum 
 2
Asia) Within the past ten years, surveys and opinions of journalists support the contention that 
self-censorship is indeed a primary factor inhibiting the press freedom in Hong Kong.   
It is my focus in this article to examine the circumstances contributing to self-censorship 
in the print media of the territory, including pre-handover warnings from the Chinese 
government, and the business expansion interests of newspaper owners.  There is also a 
discussion relating how journalists and newspapers have reacted to the presence of self- 
censorship and what changes have been observed in the press as a result of the altered attitude 
toward reporting.   
 
The Presence of Self-Censorship 
 Self-censorship did not appear immediately following the transfer of Hong Kong from 
British to Chinese control in July of 1997.  Instead, it was a growing trend witnessed by 
journalists and general readers alike both in the years approaching and those following the 
handover.  In 1997 when Carol Lai was asked when she believed that self-censorship had begun 
in Hong Kong, she responded, “Many local media, including newspapers…have been adjusting 
their reporting for quite some time, because Hong Kong people knew about the July 1 [handover] 
date since 1984.” (Nakano, p. 156)  Her hypothesis is supported by a survey of Hong Kong 
journalists in 1990 that discovered that 25 percent expressed fear of criticizing China in their 
work, and 54 percent believed that their fellow journalists shared the same fear. The cautious 
approach to journalism did not diminish in the ensuing six years, for a similar survey in 1996 
revealed that one in every four journalists expressed concerns regarding criticizing China. (Lee 
and Chu, p. 65)  According to television anchor Claudia Mo, “There’s very little commentary [in 
the press]” about certain mainland stories. She also claims that Hong Kong reports about 
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incidents in China “are all factual and safe.” (Stein, “Hong Kong's Press...”)1 Legislative Council 
member Christine Loh has noted the absence of any firsthand reports in the Hong Kong press 
about Chinese-occupied Tibet.  She felt this topic would be important to the people of the 
territory as an example of Chinese autonomous rule, and it was her opinion that the lack of 
mention in the press may have been the result of self-censorship. (Richburg)  Legislator Loh is 
not alone in her speculations of a censored press – over 44 percent of respondents in an opinion 
poll conducted in September 1997 thought the media practiced self-censorship, and 68 percent 
believed that reporters consciously refrained from criticizing the Chinese government.  (Stein, 
“Specter of Censorship”) Although the existence of self-censorship in the Hong Kong media is 
often debated, numerous factors suggest that it does occur. 
 
The Government Prepares the Press  
 The subject of press freedom was frequently addressed as Hong Kong’s legislation 
underwent changes with the approaching handover.  Government officials from the mainland 
issued statements that Hong Kong journalists viewed as warnings as to how they should proceed.  
One particular comment made to CNN in May 1996 by Lu Ping, the Director of the Hong Kong 
and Macau Office (China’s highest authority handling Hong Kong affairs), put journalists on 
high alert.  In the course of the interview, Ping stated that journalists “can say anything they like, 
but if they put it into action, they’ve to be careful.” When asked if it would be permissible for 
Hong Kong journalists to write in favor of independence of Taiwan or Hong Kong (thereby 
advocating the creation of two Chinas), Ping replied, “It is not allowed, definitely not.” (Lee and 
                                                          
1 Her claim may be opinion only.  Following the sentencing of the political dissident Xu Wenli in Beijing in 1998, 
Ming Pao printed an editorial critical of the Beijing government’s decision. The Hong Kong Standard editorialized 
with a message supporting Beijing, while the South China Morning Post chose not to editorialize at all. (Stein, 
“Hong Kong's Press...”)  These varied editorials illustrate the presence of multiple approaches to commentary in the 
press.   
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Chu, p. 61)  Within the same week, Ping clarified the difference between “advocating” and 
“objective reporting” and said, “Advocating is not a press freedom issue; advocating itself is an 
action.” (Lee and Chu,  p. 61) He also stated that “advocacy of Taiwan’s independence could be 
prosecuted under Article 23.” (Gargan, 1995)  Journalists had long been wary of Article 23 of 
Hong Kong’s Basic Law,2 for it allowed for the Special Administrative Region (SAR) legislature 
designated by Beijing to draft regulations prohibiting “treason, secession, sedition, subversion 
against the Central Government or theft of state secrets.” (Cohen) This could greatly impact 
freedom of the press, as reporters may feel a need to exercise extreme caution when writing in 
order to avoid accusations of committing the crimes outlined in Article 23.   
During a visit to the United States in March 1995, Mr. Ping attempted to assuage the 
fears of supporters of press freedom worldwide when he remarked: “The freedom of the press 
and of speech are all guaranteed.”  However, his next words were not as comforting: “After 
1997, anyone who wants to criticize the [Hong Kong] government will be free to do so.” 
(Richburg)  This comment could indicate to journalists that while opposition to the governmental 
affairs in Hong Kong was acceptable, any disapproval of China’s policies from the press would 
not be tolerated after the handover.  According to John Schidlovsky of the Freedom Forum Asian 
Center, Ping’s attitude toward the press does not guarantee freedom of speech.  In an article for 
the New York Times, Schidlovsky was quoted as saying,  “Advocacy is a part of free speech and 
should be allowed.  If he rules that out, that’s suppression of free speech.” (Gargan, 1996)  In the 
opinion of Hong Kong journalist Frank Ching, without freedom of speech Hong Kong 
newspapers will be unable to fulfill the role of the modern newspaper, which is not merely to 
                                                          
2  The post-handover constitutional document for Hong Kong.   
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 report but also to analyze and interpret the news. Ping’s comments suggest that the press should 
limit itself to presenting the arguments of the Chinese government and not attempt to dissect or 
disagree with those statements; in the environment established by Ping’s comments the press 
would not be free but instead controlled by the threat of interference from the Chinese 
government. (Ching, 1996) 
 Lu Ping was not the only official to speak out regarding the future of the Hong Kong 
press following the handover.  In July 1996, China’s information minister, Zeng Jianhui, 
forewarned that the press would be “managed” after the Chinese took control of the colony in 
1997. (Gilley)  As he put it,  “Hong Kong’s press can do what it does now, namely report what 
other people say.  But if the press says ‘We should do something [deemed harmful to China],’ 
that’s different.  No country would allow that.” (Gilley)  The Chinese Foreign Minister and Vice 
Premier Qian Qichen also warned the media to be aware that journalists “can put forward 
criticism, but not rumors or lies.  Nor can they put forward personal attacks on the Chinese 
leaders.” (Lee and Chu, p. 61)  Three years after the handover, officials continued to feel it 
necessary to remind the press how to handle matters pertaining to Taiwanese independence.  The 
South China Morning Post reported that Xing Guishan, the Taiwan affairs director of the central 
government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong, advised local reporters to avoid interviewing 
advocates of independence for Taiwan. (Ching, “Freedom with Limits”) Additionally, a deputy 
director if the Liaison Office, Wang Fengchao, informed the territory’s press that, “The media 
should not treat speeches and views which advocate Taiwan’s independence as normal news 
items, nor should they report them like normal cases of reporting the voices of different parties.  
Hong Kong’s media have the responsibility to uphold the integrity and sovereignty of the 
country.” (Chan, “Crouching Tiger...”)   
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One example of an attempt of the Hong Kong press to unify the country and impress its 
impending government occurred following the death of Deng Xiaoping in February 1997.  With 
the handover approaching in less than six months, the Hong Kong media was cautious in the 
manner in which it reported the story of the passing of one of the influential figures in the 
Chinese Revolution.  The South China Morning Post held the presses until his death was 
confirmed in order to print a poster-size photograph of the leader on the front page and to publish 
five pages of related news.  The newspaper also published a special eight-page lunch edition 
about his economic reforms and the role he had played in the handover. (Cohen)  The Hong 
Kong newspaper Ming Pao chose to use a black border around the masthead for two days and 
wrote stories that stressed the leader’s great deeds, with little mention of his role in the violent 
government opposition of the Beijing students’ pro-democracy movement. Although the editor 
of the Hong Kong Economic Journal said, “In days of grief, we should not talk too much about 
Deng’s faults,” Paul Lee and Leonard Chu contend that “in light of the previous uniform stand of 
the media against the Chinese authorities, with Deng as the paramount leader during the 1989 
Beijing students’ pro-democracy movement, such a shift of attitude could not be more ironic and 
grotesque.” (Lee and Chu, p. 74) 
 
A Climate Of Fear  
 The “climate of fear” (Gilley) encompassing the Hong Kong press was not created solely 
by China’s veiled and ominous verbal warnings, but also by its actions.  In October 1993, Gao 
Yu, the former deputy editor of the Hong Kong publication Economic Weekly, was arrested.  She 
was not heard from for one year, until the Chinese government revealed that she had been 
convicted of “leaking state secrets” (Marks) in a series of articles she had written for two of 
Hong Kong’s pro-China newspapers, the Monthly Mirror and the Overseas China Daily. 
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(Eckholm) The government insisted that her articles,3 which she had written using a pseudonym, 
were based on information derived from secret official documents, an accusation which she 
continually denied. (Eckholm)  Although she suffered from heart and kidney ailments, she was 
not released from prison on medical parole until five years into her sentence; it appeared as 
though her release was conveniently timed to precede a visit to Beijing by then United States 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright (Laris).4  
A similar event occurred in September 1993 when Xi Yang, an economics specialist and 
reporter for Ming Pao, was arrested and sentenced to 12 years in prison, accused of espionage 
regarding state financial secrets. (Mufson)  While visiting Beijing to attend his mother’s funeral 
(Richburg), Xi had written a story about the interest-rate strategy of China’s central bank. 
(Gargan, 1995) Fortunately, the reporter was released only three years into his sentence due to 
the efforts of Hong Kong and foreign journalists who launched a campaign to free him. (Chan, 
“Hong Kong...,” p. 85)  Although the Chinese government claimed that the imprisonment should 
not be viewed as a freedom of the press issue, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) 
stated in its June 1994 report that “Xi’s case had sent shock waves through the local journalist 
community and is more than likely to exacerbate the caution and self-censorship toward China 
already prevalent in the media.” (Mufson)  Another representative of the HKJA claimed that this 
event was “a warning signal [to journalists] that [they] better behave [themselves].” (Gargan, 
1995) 
                                                          
3 One article analyzed the continual influence in the government of the retired Deng Xiaoping, and the other 
discussed how the Communist Party did not separate the party and government as promised. (Eckholm)   
 
4 According to reporter Michael Laris, the Chinese government often strategically arranges dissident releases in 
order to improve diplomatic relations. (Laris)   
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In October 2000, Hong Kong journalists were reminded of the extent of the scrutiny of 
the Chinese government.  During a photo opportunity for Chinese President Jiang Zemin and 
Hong Kong’s chief executive Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong cable television reporter Sharon 
Cheung inquired if it was an “imperial order” for Mr. Tung to serve a second term as the SAR’s 
top official. (Hon)  The question was asked in order to clarify a statement made by Chinese 
official Qian Qichen the previous day in which he appeared to endorse Mr. Tung. (Landler)  The 
enraged Mr. Jiang leapt from his chair, shook his finger, and scolded the Hong Kong journalists 
saying: 
You are very familiar with Western ways, but you are too young.5  You go everywhere to 
 follow the big news, but the questions you ask are too simple, sometimes naïve.  I am not  
 a journalist, but I have seen a lot.  I need to teach you a lesson about life.  If there is any  
 discrepancy in reporting, you will be held responsible. (Landler; Gittings; Yin)  
 
Many in the Hong Kong journalistic community were shocked by the President’s response.  
However, the chairman of the pro-government Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong 
Kong, Jasper Tsang Yok Sing, claimed that Mr. Jiang was justified in losing his temper because 
any allegations or suggestions that the central government “had appointed Mr. Tung to a second 
term were very serious and a breach of the Basic Law.” (“Journalists Deny...”) Mak Yin Ting, 
the chairwoman of the HKJA, did not feel that such insinuations had been made: “The questions 
were sensible and legitimate.  Simple questions are good questions.  The interviewees have no 
room for maneuver.” (Hon)  The South China Morning Post attributed the President’s reaction to 
the fact that he was more accustomed to the “deferential journalists of the Beijing press.” (“Jiang 
Loses...”)  In any case, the event did not assist the Hong Kong journalists in clarifying their role 
                                                          
5 Veteran journalists and academics in Hong Kong have noted that many frontline journalists are in their 20s, and 
often appear at press conferences in unprofessional attire such as jeans and running shoes. (Lee, “Reporters 
Earning...”) 
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in the new government, nor did it reaffirm that press freedom was alive and thriving in the 
territory.   
 
Newspaper Editors and Self-Censorship 
 When journalists bear the wrath of governmental admonitions, it is not always 
administered directly from the government. Instead, the pressure applied by China usually has a 
strong impact on the editors and owners of newspapers, and they, in turn, apply pressure to their 
staff.  In the opinion of former HKJA chairwoman Carol Lai, the influence of editors may have 
impacted journalists’ writing more than any governmental threats.  As she states, “Most of the 
front-line journalists do have the integrity to do their jobs, to report accurately and objectively, 
and seldom censor themselves…. Some chief editors… have been doing Beijing’s dirty work by 
watering down criticism or spiking offensive stories.  It is plain old censorship.” (Stein, “Specter 
of Censorship”)  If media owners and editors do monitor the work of their journalists, the motive 
would likely be to prevent interference from the Chinese government in order to keep the 
newspaper in business and increase profits.  However, some owners may wish to expand their 
business ventures, media or otherwise, into China. (Lee and Chu, p. 66)  If they owned a 
newspaper that published news and information that was anti-China, China may inhibit this 
expansion.  Therefore, in an attempt to allow a newspaper to receive approval from China, 
editors often “avoid ruffling Beijing’s feathers” by avoiding controversial commentary. (Stein, 
“Hong Kong's Press...”)   The chief editor of the Hong Kong Economic Journal, George Shen, 
told a reporter from the Far Eastern Economic Review that it would be logical for newspaper 
owners interested in expanding their businesses into China to request that the publishing staff 
exercise self-censorship so their newspaper and business would not face difficulties after 1997.  
(Gilley)  Publisher Jimmy Lai shares a similar view: “If they [owners] have to exist in business, 
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they have to be flexible in editorials, to make themselves acceptable to the new rulers.  
Gradually, gradually, they conform.  You can feel it.  It’s a very slow metamorphosis.” (Gargan, 
1995)  In the years surrounding the handover, the Chinese government has employed several 
tactics to “encourage” media owners and editors to closely monitor their journalists as explained 
below.   
 
Relationship between Government and Press  
 Observation of the relationship of the Chinese government and the media owners and 
editors reveals that there are three methods the government uses to influence the manner in 
which the press operates in Hong Kong -- public relations, rewards, and punishment.  (Lee and 
Chu, p. 66)  Public relations and rewards are often linked, for it is not uncommon for the Chinese 
government to dine with leaders of the Hong Kong press in order to exert influence.  For 
example, the government may invite editors to a dinner and then express distaste for the work 
and/or opinions of a particular columnist, which could then result in the column being removed 
from publication.  An Oriental Daily reporter who was known for his critical opinions of China’s 
relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong found his column discontinued in June 1996 without 
explanation. It was later revealed that a high-ranking employee of the newspaper had recently 
dined with someone from the government propaganda agency, and it is speculated that this 
interaction may have contributed to the removal of the column. (Lee and Chu, p. 67) Also, if a 
reporter were to criticize China too often, he/she could find themselves excluded from the 
“reward” of an invitation to press gatherings hosted by Chinese authorities in Hong Kong, 
thereby making it more difficult to report news from the mainland. (Stein, “Hong Kong's Press...)  
For example, because of their tendency to criticize China, reporters from the Apple Daily were  
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denied permission to cover a reception planned by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong 
in 1997. (Stein, “Specter of Censorship…”)   
Punishment is the final common, silent, coercion technique.  On more than one occasion, 
the Hong Kong tycoon Jimmy Lai has found his business enterprises the victim of China’s 
punishments for unfriendly newspapers.  In 1995, Jimmy Lai started the independent, apolitical 
Apple Daily newspaper. (Lee and Chu, p. 62) According to Lai, his newspaper would focus on 
“sin and evil” because “without Eve biting the apple, we wouldn’t be in business – there 
wouldn’t be any sin and there wouldn’t be any newspapers.” (Gargan, 1995)  Lai was known to 
be a supporter of the students’ democratic movement in Beijing in 1989, and five years later he 
wrote an article in his magazine Next criticizing the Chinese Premier Li Peng. (Steinberger) In 
the July 22, 1994 issue, Lai referred to Peng as “the son of a turtle’s egg with zero IQ”6 
(Richburg), stating that Peng was a “shame to the Chinese people” and suggesting that he “drop 
dead.” (Mufson)  Because of Lai’s opposition to the communist Chinese government, reporters 
from the Apple Daily were later denied entry into China (Lee and Chu,  p. 66), and the 
newspaper does not have any advertisers from companies under the control of China. (Cohen)  
Lai also suffered financial punishment when the government temporarily closed the Beijing 
outlet of his clothing store, Giordano, when his insulting article was published. (Steinberger)  
The store’s board of directors urged Lai to resign because they felt the closing of the store was 
related to the publication of the article.  As a result, he did surrender voting rights to his 
controlling block of the company, acknowledging that, “The media is a sensitive business.  If the 
media work affects Giordano, it is not fair to other shareholders.” (Mufson)  Lai’s publishing 
business suffered further financial trouble in February 1997 when the guarantor of Lai’s 
                                                          
6 This is a Chinese expression used to imply doubts about paternity. (Kristof)   
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publishing group withdrew its support, and the company could no longer be publically traded on 
the Hong Kong stock exchange. (Lee and Chu, p. 66)  The reason cited for the guarantor's 
withdrawal of support was “pressure” and the fact that one bank admitted that political motives 
prevented its involvement. (Lee and Chu, p. 66)   
 Although the Apple Daily has met with much opposition from the Chinese government, it 
has continued to thrive and remains popular with the citizens of Hong Kong, boasting the second 
largest readership in the territory in 1996. (Lee and Chu, p. 62)  Still, Lai believes he is safe from 
Beijing’s ultimate vengeance, a demand for him to cease publication, because “Beijing will be 
eager to show that it can maintain Hong Kong’s prosperity; silencing the colony’s most 
prominent publisher will not boost investor confidence.” (Steinberger)  Other editors and 
journalists are not as confident as Jimmy Lai, however.  Fong So, an editor of the monthly 
publication The Nineties, expressed the concerns of many in the publishing business when he 
stated: “If that sort of thing can happen to a businessman like Jimmy Lai, then for ordinary 
journalists things can be a lot worse.  People are going to be very cautious about what they say, 
especially about the Chinese leadership.” (Mufson)   
 Certain newspapers have taken measures to appease China and prevent repercussions 
from the government.  Some newspapers have employed former mainland journalists in order to 
appear to take a more China-centric view of Hong Kong.  For example, the newspaper Ming Pao 
has attempted to remain in China’s good graces by establishing an editorial staff in which 11 of 
the 14 editors are former mainland reporters; in 1997 the New York Times noted that Ming Pao 
had “reduced the space given to columnists critical of China and has toned down its previously 
aggressive reporting of China.” (Kristof) The South China Morning Post went a step further by 
employing Feng Xiliang, a Beijing journalist and former editor of an English language 
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newspaper that reported Chinese governmental news, as an editorial consultant in April 1997. 
(Lee, “Media Structure...,” p. 127)  The intent to become more “China friendly” was not received 
positively by all journalists and readers, however, especially in relation to the resignation of the 
Post’s well-respected journalist Willy Lo-Wap Lam in November 2000.  Lam's decision 
followed the newspaper’s announcement that he would be removed from his position as 
coordinator of Chinese coverage.  The Post said this choice was made “to expand and diversify” 
its coverage of China, but Lam stated that he and many of his colleagues believed there were 
“increasing attempts to de-politicize the China coverage to steer away from sensitive political 
matters.” (“Hong Kong Press Freedom”)  In the June 28, 2000, edition of the Post, Lam authored 
an article entitled “Marshalling the SAR’s tycoons.”  The opening line of the article read: “Overt 
influence?  Evidently not.  Indirect, subtle interference? Apparently so.” (Lam)  The article 
continued with implications that Hong Kong businessmen attending a meeting in Beijing had 
been encouraged to support the Hong Kong chief executive Tung Chee-hwa in return for 
business favors in mainland China.  (“Hong Kong Press Freedom”) Lam wrote:  “It is understood 
that hints were given that…Beijing would rather hand lucrative deals to ‘patriotic’ executives 
than foreigners.” (Lam)  One of the newspaper’s major shareholders, Robert Kuok (who attended 
the meetings in Beijing), was offended by Lam's inferences and wrote a letter to the Post stating 
that the article was “full of distortions and speculation.” (“Hong Kong Press Freedom”)  His 
irritation arose primarily because of his own close ties with China (he had been appointed as the 
Hong Kong affairs advisor and was a member of the SAR Preparatory Committee and Selection 
Committee), and it was noted by the HKJA that the Post had reduced and diluted its coverage of 
China since Kuok became an owner in 1993. (Lee, “Media Structure...,” p. 127)  Mr. Lam, on the 
other hand, was supported by his co-workers, 115 of whom signed a petition “reaffirming their 
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commitment to editorial freedom.” (Goff)  Although it appears as though the press was 
reorganizing in order to combat the interference of China, this adjustment made by the Post may 
have been intended to increase profits and may have contributed to the deterioration in the 
quality of reporting in Hong Kong.   
 
The Changing Standards 
 A 1990 Chinese University of Hong Kong study of journalists in Hong Kong revealed 
that achieving journalistic integrity was a priority for most members of the press.  Of those 
surveyed, 95 percent of journalists considered “objective reporting” and “rapid dissemination” an 
important element of reporting, and 92 percent believed that analysis and interpretation of 
complex issues was essential to their work. (Reported in Lee and Chu, p. 60)  Unfortunately, the 
actions of the Chinese government in the following ten years may have squelched their noble 
endeavors, and the focus of reporting has been slowly changing.  According to Pan Zhongdong, a 
professor of journalism at Chinese University in Hong Kong, the goal of maintaining “objective 
reporting” may have been overridden by economic motives inspired by political influence.  Mr. 
Zhongdong told the New York Times that newspapers and reporters “want to reach a mass 
audience, and to avoid partisanship.” (Faison)  Since the late 1960s, the major newspapers of 
Hong Kong have become increasingly less partisan and have avoided taking stances that would 
not be widely well-received, and instead have concentrated more on the market economy and 
middle class liberalism in order to increase profit. (Lee, “Media Structure...,” p. 127)  An 
examination of the political stance of the three newspapers groups with the largest readerships in 
Hong Kong reveals this fact.  The two newspapers with the greatest popularity are deemed 
apolitical and independent/apolitical, and the third most popular newspaper is classified as pro-
Beijing.  While the first and second most popular newspapers have readerships of 1.5 million and 
14
 15
1.3 million, respectively, the pro-Beijing paper trails considerably, with a readership of only 
593,000. (Lee and Chu, p. 61)  In order to survive economically, newspapers had to survive 
politically and therefore covered stories that would be inoffensive to the government and that 
would appease their readers.   
 One way Hong Kong's newspapers avoid devoting space to politically sensitive topics is 
to assign their reporters to cover other, non-controversial topics.  For example, the Oriental 
Daily News employs only 10 political reporters, but 20 economic, 80 “spot news” and 30 societal 
reporters.  (Lee, “How Free Is the Press...,” p. 130)  The Apple Daily also has a disproportionate 
number of reporters for each main section of its coverage (100 lifestyle, 90 crime, versus 40 
political reporters).  Lai insists, however, that this breakdown is representative of the interests of 
his readers. (Steinberger) Kin-Ming Liu, the general manager of the Apple Daily, claims that 
newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington Post could not survive in the Hong 
Kong market, because readers do not like to be lectured and the press “is not trying to educate 
people.” (Liu)  The Apple Daily is a market-driven newspaper, according to Liu, and it provides 
the type of scandalous information people prefer to read for entertainment.  Some observers 
would disagree, however, and assert that this distribution of reporting staff is not a commercial 
endeavor, but rather an endeavor linked to an attempt to avoid governmental implied restrictions.  
 Research conducted at the Chinese University in 1997 suggests that perhaps Hong Kong 
has chosen to focus more on internal issues in order to prevent clashing with China.  When the 
content of the editorials of major newspapers was systematically analyzed throughout the 1997 
handover year, it was determined that 56.2 percent of the editorials focused solely on issues in 
Hong Kong.  Only 8 percent of editorials focused on issues in China, and 7.6 percent on issues 
pertaining to the interactions between Hong Kong and China. (Leung, p.131) Incidentally, these 
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figures (8 and 7.6 percent) were the third and fourth highest percentages in a ranking of the 
amount of editorial coverage granted to topics in Hong Kong editorials.7  Also, the research 
found that there was a tendency for newspapers to focus on the sensational, rather than on factual 
and unbiased stories.  Some reporters had no qualms about invading the privacy of others, or 
twisting and fabricating facts to create a scandalous piece of news. (Stein, “Hong Kong's 
Press...”)  With the assistance of bugging devices on police communication, the Oriental Daily 
News boasted of its ability to get to the scene of a crime faster than the police. (Lee, “Media 
Structure...,” p. 130)  Meanwhile, the Apple Daily pays readers to participate in weekly focus 
groups that inform the newspaper as to what information most interests the public at any given 
time. (Steinberger)  As a result, it is not uncommon for a front page to contain a headline such as 
“Corpse Did Not Decompose in Three Years; Police Suspect Dry Ice,” as one Apple Daily 
headline did the week before the handover in 1997. (Faison)  The change in reporting focus and 
style has not gone unnoticed by the public.  When polled in September 1998, 29 percent of 
readers felt that the media was irresponsible.  In January 1999, this number increased to 41 
percent (Ching, “The Hong Kong Press...,” p. 162).  Although it was difficult to pinpoint exactly 
why, the press in Hong Kong was noticeably changing, and no one knew the extent the change 
would reach.   
 
Conclusion 
 The Hong Kong Journalist Association Report in 1999 cited self-censorship as an 
ongoing problem; Mak Yin-ting, the HKJA chairperson stated that it was perhaps “the main 
threat to an independent and free press in Hong Kong.” (Kubiske) In the World Press Freedom 
                                                          
7 The second highest percentage, 19.1, belonged to a category entitled “all other,” meaning editorial space devoted 
to an assortment of unspecified countries.   
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Review of 1999, he also made mention of an experiment in which a live frog was placed in a pot 
of cold water, and the water was heated so slowly that the frog did not attempt to jump out until 
it was too late. The frog was unable to escape because it had adapted to the increasingly hot 
water and could not recognize the approaching harm. (Mak)  According to Mak, this may be the 
fate of press freedom in Hong Kong, the analogy being that the Chinese government “heats the 
water,” and as the Hong Kong press “adapts” to the raising temperature, it loses its “life,” that is, 
its freedom.  Identifying the presence of self-censorship is not a simple matter, because it is not 
something a respectable journalist would prefer to admit. However, it appears as though many 
individuals familiar with journalism and the press in Hong Kong find self-censorship to be a 
serious threat.  As Hong Kong continues to define itself in the post-1997 environment of “one 
country, two systems,” journalists and citizens alike hope that press freedom will not suffer as a 
result of the transition.  
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